A secret key agreement setup between three users is considered in which each of the users 1 and 2 intends to share a secret key with user 3 and users 1 and 2 are eavesdroppers with respect to each other. The three users observe i.i.d. outputs of correlated sources and there is a generalized discrete memoryless multiple access channel (GDMMAC) from users 1 and 2 to user 3 for communication between the users. The secret key agreement is established using the correlated sources and the GDMMAC. In this setup, inner and outer bounds of the secret key capacity region are investigated. Moreover, for a special case where the channel inputs and outputs and the sources form Markov chains in some order, the secret key capacity region is derived. Also a Gaussian case is considered in this setup.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret key sharing between two legitimate users in the presence of an eavesdropper was considered in [1] and [2] in the source and the channel models. In the source model, all the three users could observe i.i.d. outputs of correlated sources and there was a noiseless public channel with unlimited capacity for communication between the two legitimate users, through which all communications could be intercepted by the eavesdropper. In [1] , secret key capacity is characterized in the source model when the noiseless public channel is oneway. In [3] , secret key sharing in a source model with public channel of limited capacity is investigated in which there is a helper with access to source observations correlated with the others observations. In [4] , the same problem of sharing a secret key is investigated in the source model where instead of the public channel, there is a noisy broadcast channel from the transmitter to the receiver and the eavesdropper. In [5] , secret key sharing is considered in a framework where two users intend to share secret keys with a base station and the two users are eavesdroppers of each other's key. In [5] , all the three users can observe i.i.d. outputs of correlated sources and there is a noiseless public channel with unlimited capacity from users 1 and 2 to user 3.
Motivated by the above works, we consider secret key sharing in a framework similar to [5] but in more conformity with real communication scenarios since the realization of public channel with unlimited capacity is not compatible with the noisy nature of wireless networks. Hence, instead of public channels with unlimited capacity, we consider noisy channels for communication between the users. Each of the users 1 and 2, as network users, intends to share a secret key with user 3, as a base station, and users 1 and 2 are the eavesdroppers with respect to each other. The three users have access to correlated sources and there is a generalized discrete memoryless multiple access channel (GDMMAC) to transmit the required information from users 1 and 2 to user 3. Users 1 and 2 govern the inputs of the GDMMAC and each of the three users receives his corresponding output from the channel. Each of the users 1 and 2 generates a secret key from his observations and sends the required information via the GDMMAC to user 3. Users 1 and 2 use the channel outputs and the source observations to eavesdrop on each other's key. For this setup, we derive an inner bound of the secret key capacity region in which a combination of wiretap codebook and secret key generation codebook along with Wyner-Ziv codebook is used. Furthermore, an explicit outer bound of the secret key capacity region is given and for a special case, the secret key capacity region is derived. Also, the problem is discussed in a Gaussian case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II, the proposed model is described. In Section III, our main results are given. A special case is investigated in Section IV. A Gaussian example is discussed in Section V. Conclusion and suggestions for future works are given in Section VI. Proofs of the theorems are presented in Appendices. Throughout the paper, a random variable is denoted with an upper case letter (e.g X) and its realization is denoted with the corresponding lower case letter (e.g., x). We use X N i to indicate vector (X i,1 , X i,2 , ..., X i,N ), and X k i,j to indicate vector (X i,j , X i,j+1 , ..., X i,k ), where i denotes the index of the corresponding user.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Users 1, 2 and 3 observe i.i.id. outputs of correlated discrete memoryless sources S 1 , S 2 and S 3 , respectively, with joint distribution P S1,S2,S3 . Furthermore, there is a GDMMAC with probability distribution P Y1,Y2,Y3|X1,X2 , independent of the sources, where users 1 and 2 govern the inputs X 1 and X 2 , and then, outputs Y 1 , Y 2 and Y 3 are received by users 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Each of users 1 and 2 intends to share a secret keys with user 3 where user 1 is the eavesdropper of user 2's secret key and vice versa.
For the secret key agreement, users 1 and 2 generate secret keys K 1 and K 2 as stochastic functions of the information available at them, i.e., S N 1 and S N 2 , respectively. For i = 1, 2, ..., N , the i-th channel inputs X 1,i and X 2,i 2012 IEEE Information Theory Workshop 978-1-4673-0223-4/12/$31.00 ©2012 IEEE are determined as stochastic mappings X1,i = f1,i(S N 1 ) and X2,i = f2,i(S N 2 ) by users 1 and 2, respectively. These inputs are sent over the GDMMAC and then, the channel outputs Y 1,i , Y 2,i and Y 3,i are received by users 1, 2 and 3, respectively. User 3 computes estimates of the keys K 1 and K 2 as:
(1) where g is a deterministic function. Users 1 and 2 use the channel outputs Y N 1 and Y N 2 to eavesdrop on each other's key, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that the number of source observations is the same as the channel uses. When these are not the same, the results can be deduced by considering a normalization coefficient. All the keys and random variables take values from some finite sets. Now, we state the conditions that should be met in the described secret key sharing framework as shown in Fig.1 .
Definition 1: In the secret key agreement strategy of the proposed model, the rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is an achievable key rate pair if for every ε > 0 and sufficiently large N , we have: ( 2) means that user 3 correctly estimates the secret keys and equations (3) and (4) mean that users 1 and 2 effectively have no information about each other's secret keys.
Definition 2: The region containing all the achievable secret key rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) is the secret key capacity region.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Now, we state the main result of the paper.
Theorem 1: In the described model, all rate pairs in the closure of the convex hall of the set of all key rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) that satisfy the following region are achievable:
subject to the constraints:
where in the above equations, (R1,R2) satisfies:
for random variables taking values in sufficiently large finite sets according to the distributions:
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix I. Here, the sketch of the proof is given. To derive this inner bound, a User 1 User 3 User 2 Fig. 1 : Secret key sharing using correlated sources over GDMMAC part of the keys between the users is generated by using the source common randomness and the other part is generated by exploiting the channel common randomness. For this purpose, we impose the separation strategy as in [4] to the GDMMAC. At the first part of secret key sharing, users 1 and 2 generate secret keys using source observations. To share these keys with user 3, some information should be sent by users 1 and 2 via the GDMMAC according to Wyner-Ziv codebook for multiple sources as in [7] and this information should satisfy the constraints of Theorem 1. The information sent by each user is independent of his secret key. On the other hand, the GDMMAC is noisy and not all of the information sent by user 1 can be decoded by user 2 and vice versa. Hence, part of the information sent via the GDMMAC can be itself used for secret key generation exploiting the channel common randomness. The latter rates are achievable if they belong to the secrecy rate region of the GDMMAC in [6] .
Proposition 1: The following region is an explicit outer bound of the secret key capacity region in the described setup:
The proof is given in the extended version of the paper in [8] .
It should be noted that the separation strategy used in achievability may not be optimal in general and hence, we could not yet derive the secret key capacity region. In the next section, we investigate a special case where the rate region in Theorem 1 can achieve the capacity region.
IV. SPECIAL CASE
In this section, we consider a special case of the general problem discussed in the previous sections. This special case arises when the channel inputs and outputs and the sources form Markov chains as:
Also, we constrain a special condition to the channel such that each of the channel inputs can be specified with access to the receiver's channel output and the other transmitter's input or in other words:
In this case, the GDMMAC cannot itself provide secrecy; due to the Markov chains between the inputs and outputs, however, it can be used by users 1 and 2 to transmit the required information of the source common randomness. The secret key capacity region is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 2:
In the mentioned special case of the described setup, the secret key capacity region is the set of all rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) that satisfy:
, subject to the constraints:
The achievability can be deduced from Theorem 1 by substituting V 1 = X 1 , V 2 = X 2 and employing the Markov chains. The outer bound is proved in Appendix II. In this example, the GDMMAC is used just to transmit the required source common randomness information and hence, the problem can be treated as a pure source model with rate limited public channels. When the channel rates satisfy:
, the case is similar to the special case of the forward source model of [5] where the secret key capacity is the union of all rate pairs that satisfy:
V. A GAUSSIAN EXAMPLE
As a scalar Gaussian example, we consider the case where the source observations at the users are according to Markov chain S 1 − S 3 − S 2 . Then, without loss of generality, we can model them as S 1 = S 3 + E s,1 , S 2 = S 3 + E s,2 where S 3 , E s,1 and E s,2 are independent zero mean Gaussian variables with variances P 3 , N s,1 and N s,2 , respectively. The GDMMAC is described by:
in which E c,i ∼ N (0, N c,i ) for i = 1, 2, 3 with the input power constraints P 1 and P 2 at users 1 and 2, respectively. By the standard arguments as the discrete channel arguments, the results can be extended to Gaussian case. We consider:
By substituting the random variables as above in Theorem 1, the following proposition for secret key rate region can be deduced for which the proof is relinquished due to space limitation. Proposition 2: (R 1 , R 2 ) is an achievable key rate pair if is satisfies the equations at the top of the next page.
For the values P 1 = P 2 = P 3 = 1, N s,1 = N s,2 = N c,3 = 0.5, the rate region is shown in Fig. 2 where N c,1 = N c,2 and they vary from 0.5 to 0.9. When N c,1 = N c,2 = 0.5, no secret key can be generated through GDMMAC and the second terms of the secret key rates bound in Proposition 2 will be zero. In this case, the region is the secret key rate region of a pure source model with rate limited public channels. When these noises increase, the key rate region enlarges however the sum rate boundary remains fixed since the sum rate term related to channel common randomness is zero until these noises amount to about N c,1 = N c,2 = 0.75. At this point, the term related to the channel common randomness in the sum rate bound would be positive and hence, the sum rate bound increases. For N c,1 = N c,2 = 0.8, the rate region is rectangular since each user's rate bound in proposition 2 will exceed the total sum rate bound. For N c,1 = N c,2 = 0.9, this region becomes pentagonal as the sum rate due to channel common randomness is increased such that the total sum rate bound dominates each user's rate bound.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problem of secret key sharing in a combined framework with both source and the channel common randomness was studied. For this problem, the inner bound and the explicit outer bound of the secret key capacity region were derived. The separation strategy used to achieve the inner bound was not optimal in general, however, for the especial case where the channel inputs and outputs and the sources form Markov chains in some order, the secret key capacity region was derived. It was shown that this case can be simulated as the source model of key agreement with public channels of limited capacity. As future work, the joint source channel coding can be investigated instead of the separation strategy. In addition, in a more practical scenario, some types of dependency between the source and the channel can be supposed.
APPENDIX I

Proof of Theorem 1
We fix the distribution to be the same as in Theorem 1. Users 1 and 2 independently and randomly generate typical sequences u N 1 and u N 2 , respectively, each with probability:
The number of the sequences u N 1 and u N 2 are 2 N (I(U1;S1)+ε ) , and 2 N (I(U2;S2)+ε ) , respectively, in which ε > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily small. Using two-layered random binning, they are labeled as: P3+Ns,1) )]
Nc,1 )] + due to the constraints: N s,2 ) , P3+Ns,2) ) A , A 2 = (P3+Ns,2) 2 (Ns,1Nc,3+(P1+P2) (P3+Ns,1) ) A . where in the above equations:
where: r1S +r 1S = I(U1; S1)−I(U1; S2)+2ε , r 1S = I(U1; S2)−ε , (7) r2S +r 2S = I(U2; S2)−I(U2; S1)+2ε , r 2S = I(U2; S1)−ε , (8) It is obvious that r 1S +r 1S +r 1S = I(U 1 ; S 1 )+ε and so, each sequence u N 1 can be determined if the indices (k 1S , k 1S , k 1S ) are known. The same is true for u N 2 . In addition to the secret key codebooks, the wiretap channel codebooks are generated. Users 1 and 2 generate independent sequences v N 1 and v N 2 , respectively, each with probability:
We consider a rate pair (R 1 ,R 2 ) which satisfies (6) and the rate constraints of Theorem 1 hold. We define C MAC including all rate pairs (R 1 ,R 2 ) which satisfies (6) and also:
The number of sequences v N 1 and v N 2 is 2 NR1 and 2 NR2 , respectively, which are labeled as:
Two functions f 1 and f 2 are defined as:
where V 1 and V 2 are the set of 2 NR1 and 2 NRt codewords v N 1 and v N 2 , respectively. Mapping f 1 is a random partitioning of codewords v N 1 into 2 Nr 1S equal-sized parts. Elements of part i are labeled as (V 1 ) i . Mapping f 2 is similarly defined.
For encoding, when typical sequences s N 1 and s N 2 are observed at users 1 and 2, respectively, sequences u N 1 and u N 2 are chosen at the corresponding users such that (s N 1 , u N 1 ) and (s N 2 , u N 2 ) are ε −jointly typical. It can be seen that these sequences are unique with high probability for arbitrarily small ε . For the sequences u N 1 (k 1S , k 1S , k 1S ) and u N 2 (k 2S , k 2S , k 2S ), the indices k 1S and k 2S are chosen by users 1 and 2, respectively, to share with user 3 as the secret keys due to the source observations. For this purpose, the indices k 1S and k 2S are the required information to be sent by users 1 and 2 to user 3. User 1 encodes k 1S in such a way that he returns v N 1 randomly chosen from (V 1 ) k 2S using the mapping f 1 . User 2 acts in a same way using mapping f 2 and returns v N 2 . For the selected v N 1 (k 1C , k 1C ) and v N 2 (k 2C , k 2C ), user 1 and 2, respectively, consider k 1C and k 2C to share with user 3 as the secret keys due to the channel common randomness. Then, the channel inputs x N 1 and x N 2 are sent over GDMMAC according to the distributions p(x 1 |v 1 ) and p(x 2 |v 2 ). 
exists and is unique. Otherwise, it declares error. It can be shown that the decoding error probability of this step is bounded as: After correct decoding (k 1C , k 1C ) and (k 2C , k 2C ), user 3 considers k 1C and k 2C to share with users 1 and 2, respectively, 2012 IEEE Information Theory Workshop as the secret keys due to the channel common randomness. Then, using functions f 1 and f 2 , user 3 finds the mappings (V 1 ) i of the codeword v N 1 and (V 2 ) j of the codeword v N 2 and sets k 1S = i, k 2S = j. Now, user 3 decodes sequences u N 1 (k 1S , k 1S , k 1S ) and u N 2 (k 2S , k 2S , k 2S ) such that:
exists and is unique. Otherwise, it declares error. For ε 2 = ε 16 , according to Wyner-Ziv problem for multiple sources in [7] , we can choose N sufficiently large that P (7) and (8) After this step of decoding, user 3 considers k 1S and k 2S to share with users 1 and 2, respectively, as the secret keys due to the source observations.
By the above arguments, the total decoding error probability is bounded as P
It should be noted that in the definition of r 1C in (9), we assumed that R 1 > I(V 1 ; X 2 , Y 2 |V 2 ). If it does not hold, we generate 2 NR1 codewords v N 1 and there is no need for random labeling as r 1C = 0. The same is true for r 2C . Due to space limitation, the security analysis and the proof of the independency of the keys are relegated to [8] .
APPENDIX II
Proof of the converse in Theorem 2
To derive the outer bound in Theorem 2, for an arbitrary small ε > 0, we use Fano's inequality and security conditions as:
where ε 1 → 0 if ε → 0. We prove the outer bound of R 1 . The outer bound of R 2 can be deduced by symmetry. where (a) results from the security condition, (b) from the Markov chain (X 1 ,X 2 ) −Y 2 −Y 3 , (c) from Fano's inequality, (d) from the fact that H(X 1 |X 2 ,Y 3 ) = 0, (e) from the fact that given (X 1 ,X 2 ), Y 3 is independent of (S 1 ,S 2 ,S 3 ),(f) from the fact that given S N 3,i+1 ,(K 1 , X N 1 ) is independent of S N 2,i+1 which is the direct consequence of the Markov chain S 1 −S 3 −S 2 , (g) from the Markov chain S 3,i −(S N 3,i+1 ,S 2,i ,S i−1 1,1 ,K 1 ,X N 1 )−S i−1 2,1 which arises because (K 1 , X N 1 ) is a function of S N 1 , (h) from the definition of the random variable U 1,i as: U 1,i = (S N 3,i+1 , S i−1 1,1 , K 1 , X N 1 ) and (i) from the definition of the random variable Q which is uniformly distributed on {1,2, ...,N } and setting ε = ε 1 + ε. With the same approaches as above, we have R 2 ≤ I(U 2,Q ;S 3,Q |S 1,Q ) + ε where U 2,i is defined as U 2,i = (S i−1 3,1 ,S N 2,i+1 ,K 2 ,X N 2 ). It can be seen that the defined random variables satisfy the distribution of theorem 2.
To prove the rate constraints of Theorem 2, we have:
